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Abstract 
Since the late 1940s, the Kashmir region has been a disputed area. The three central actors
involved in  this  conflict  (the Kashmiri  people,  India and Pakistan)  have been claiming
sovereignty over the region. Ever since, there has been a constant dispute over the Kashmiri
territory which of late has turned more violent. During the 1990s, turmoil in Kashmir got a
new momentum and since then it stopped to subside despite occasional lull. While there
was hope for reconciliation in  the early 21st century with the improvement  of bilateral
relations between India and Pakistan, it soon disappeared when Indo-Pak rivalry reached a
new height. 
In July 2016, another wave of armed riots erupted in Kashmir after the Indian army killed
the pro-Kashmir independence militant, Burhan Wani. Such event raised the question one
more time concerning who has   a legitimate right over this  territory, and if  there is  a
possibility to finally close this chapter of uncertainty in Kashmir.  
This thesis seeks to explore the question of sovereignty focusing on the different narratives
and cultural identities related to the Kashmir conflict which are all embedded in the concept
of  Kashmiriyat.  Through  the  analysis  of  multiple  sources  (including  books  and  book
chapters,  online  and  printed  articles),  this  thesis  evaluates  the  possibility  of  conflict
resolution in the region and even envisages the possibility of Kashmir’s independence. This
strife  has  been  long  forgotten  by  the  international  community  and  under  the  current
circumstances and stalemate in the Indo-Pak relations there is little possibility to find a
viable solution at the regional level. By raising awareness on the issue, this thesis aims to
contribute to redirect attention on a long lasting and unsolved struggle. 
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Introduction 
The second part of the 20th century was quite remarkable in humankind history due to the
decolonization process. Third world countries experienced upheavals while national leaders
were building their own nation states. Indeed, the South Asia region was no exception to
this rule.  The creation of India and Pakistan also triggered a series of violent episodes.
Many of these were related to the sovereignty of the state of Kashmir.  
As a matter of fact, Kashmir has been a disputed territory since the partition of the Indian
sub-continent. Both India and Pakistan claimed to have authority over the region. Yet, the
dispute among these nations has left the native people living in this territory having no say
in the matter, despite the fact that there are some Kashmiri leaders who want independence
for their nation. 
Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought several wars (1947-1948 partition crisis and
Indo-Pak war, the 1965 second Indo-Pak war, the 1971 war, and the 1999 Kargil war1)
while  claiming  legitimacy  of  the  region.   In  addition  to  the  Indo-Pak  struggles,  the
Kashmiri  people  have  also  fought  against  both  nations  to  become sovereign  (the  most
famous episode has been the 90’s security crisis in India). 
1 Rahnam Indurthy and Muhammad Haque, “The Kashmir conflict: why it defies solution”, in International Journal on
World Peace (USA), vol. 28, nº1, 2010, pp. 9.  
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 Map of the disputed areas of Kashmir, source: Anne Noronha Dos Santos, Military Intervention and Secession
in South Asia, the cases of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir and Punjab, p. 68.
Notwithstanding, these major clashes were controlled. In the mid 00’s (especially after the
9/11 attacks), there were hopes for a final consensus. This was related to the improvement
of  the  bilateral  relations  between  India  and  Pakistan2.  Nevertheless,  this  positive
perspective seems to be fading away after the surge of a new wave of more destabilizing
and violent riots in July 2016. This time such events took place in the light of the killing by
the  Indian  army of  pro-Kashmir  independence  militant  called  Burhan  Wani3.  This  last
outbreak of  security crisis  clearly proves that  the claim of sovereignty over  the region
remains an unsolved issue.
2 Noor Ahmad Baba, “Resolving Kashmir: imperatives and solutions”, in Race and Class (Washington), vol. 56, n°2, 
2014, p. 70.  
3 The  Economist,  Kashmir  reviving  the  cause,  available  in  http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21704828-turmoil-
kashmir-has-reopened-old-wound-and-hardened-anti-india-sentiment-pakistan-reviving (Accessed on May 16th 2017).
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Besides, it might seem that the international community has transformed the conflict into a
ghost by forgetting its existence. Peace keeping organizations keep bringing old fashion
remedies  and  recommendations  based  on  the  former  1948  UN  resolution.  All  the
suggestions presented on the 1948 document have been barely considered during the past
69 years and there is no real engagement towards a clear settlement. This could make us
wonder whether there is a possible solution to this never-ending story.
In this thesis, I would like to question to what extent is Kashmir’s freedom struggle viable?
What are the pros and cons arguments of the actors involved in this matter? Will peaceful
coexistence and syncretism remain the salient characteristic of Kashmiri society?  Would
divergent  opinions  affect  in  the  drafting  of  a  final  consensus?  Is  there  a  best  or  ideal
resolution to this issue?
Throughout  this  thesis,  I  will  try  to  explain  which  are  the  different  narratives  on  the
Kashmir conflict via the concept of “Kashmiriyat”. In the first place, I will define the term
Kashmiriyat and in which ways it helps to understand the current socio-political conflict.
Second,  I  will  present  the  different  historical  and  cultural  aspects  that  are  linked  to
Kashmiriyat.  Third,  I  will  try  to  illustrate  the  different  perspectives  of  all  the  actors
involved. Finally, I will assess if there is a possibility for a dispute resolution. 
The purpose of this thesis is to have an overall perspective of the current developments on
the region and explore whether the actors could reach a consensus. I will use a historical
analytical approach recapitulating the main events of the history of Kashmir which led to
the ongoing crisis. The latest riot eruption indicates that this remains an unsolved matter. To
obtain a final jurisdiction and understand the causalities and background of these uprisings,
this  issue  must  be  further  explored.  This  thesis  aims  to  help  to  understand  what
Kashmiriyat stand for, and to have a better perspective on what is at the heart of the dispute.
The above aim will be accomplished by fulfilling the following research objectives: analyze
and  understand  the  cultural  and  political  trajectories  of  Kashmiriyat through  time  to
identify the motives of the metamorphose of  Kashmiriyat (from a cultural to a political
entity), as well as the political circumstances and the causalities of the diverse uprisings in
Kashmir.   
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Chapter I.  Conceptualizing Kashmiriyat 
Kashmiriyat constitutes the core of this thesis. Hence, at the outset, a proper understanding
of  this  concept  is  essential,  since  it  will  help  us  to  start  distinguishing  patterns  and
arguments  of  the  different  actors  involved  in  the  conflict.  Especially  considering  that
regional  and  territorial  dispute  emphasize  different  meanings,  a  study  of  the  term  is
required. Just as Ahmed and Saklani claim: 
“At present Kashmir is passing through turmoil due to many unfortunate reasons and intolerance.
The hatred, mistrust and communal enmity has brought bad name to Kashmir. In such a horrible
situation,  the  study  of  Kashmiriyat is  significant  in  which  may  present  a  useful  enquiry  in
establishing the loss of serenity and peace in Kashmir […]”4
Kashmiriyat: multiple understandings
To begin with, one could question what does actually  Kashmiriyat stands for? Aggarwal
states that this term can be easily defined as an abstract noun that represents the ethos of
being Kashmiri. If transliterated, the term could be prescribed as ‘origin or affiliation to
Kashmir’5. 
So far, even if there is a general definition of the term  Kashmiriyat, there is still ample
debate on what does it precisely stands for. Just as Hangloo declares: 
“[…] the term Kashmiriyat has been used too often and in such diverse contexts that one begins to
doubt whether it means the same thing at all times or refers to different things at different times.”6
Hangloo  argues  that  overall,  the  term  Kashmiriyat is  a  combination  of  many  of  the
arguments given by different visions of scholars. As he states: 
“Kashmiriyat does  not  only mean simply a harmonious relationship cutting across  religious and
sectarian divisions or pluralistic tradition, but it is a far wider concept that has grown over centuries
of  historical  process  that  the  region  of  Kashmir  has  embraced,  both  in  peace  and  in  turmoil.
4 Irfan Ahmed, & D. P. Saklani, “Evolution of Kashmiriyat, a Case of Socio-Cultural Assimilation During 14 th and 15th 
Century” in Remarking an Analisation (India), vol. 1, n°8, 2016, p. 73.
5 Neil Aggarwal, “Kashmiriyat as Empty Signifier”, in Interventions (USA), vol. 10, n°2, 2008, p. 227. 
6 Rattan Lal Hangloo, “Kashmiriyat: the voice of the past misconstrued”, in Nyla Ali Khan et. al. (coords.), The 
Parchment of Kashmir, History, Society and Polity, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2012, p. 37.
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Kashmiriyat is not a mere concept but an institution with societal, political, economic and cultural
currents and undercurrents.7” 
The origin and evolution
Kashimiriyat´s idea can be traced to the historical past of Kashmir. In the 13 th century, the
main  religions  of  the  valley  (Hinduism  and  Buddhism)  encountered  Islam8.  The  new
religion seemed appealing to many of the inhabitants of the region who converted to Islam.
Such religious and cultural encounter created a new culture by assimilating various ethno-
religious traditions and beliefs that were shared among the different communities. 
This  idea  of  sharing  traditions  came  to  be  called  the  Hindu-Muslim  “Rishi-Sufi”
movement9. The most important part of such movement was experienced between the 14th
and 15th century. It was during this period that there was a clear socio-cultural assimilation
process in Kashmir10.  
Certain characters such as Lalla Ded influenced this concept.  Ded was a Sufi mystic (born
in a Hindu household) from the 14th century. She managed to prove that there could be an
in between among Hindu Vedic traditions and Muslim mysticism. Among her legacy relies
the foundation of Kashmir’s biggest Sufi order11. 
Indeed, the success of Islam in Kashmir is strongly linked to the fact that Sufi Saints were
able to cope with the cultural differences and managed to live collectively together12. Also,
Sufism is a division of Islam which does not preach strict orthodox values. Hence, this
facilitated cultural assimilation. Just as Ahmed and Saklani state:
“So, the Islam practiced by the people of Kashmir has been predominantly Sufi in nature rather than
orthodox, that led to the development of the composite culture and more a kind of society in which
people were well aware of their religiosity, but never let come in between their relationships with
each other.13”
7 Ibid., p. 43.
8 Irfan Ahmed & D. P. Saklani, “Evolution of Kashmiriyat, a Case of Socio-Cultural Assimilation During 14 th and 15th 
Century”, op. cit., p. 75.
9 Ibid., p. 75.
10 Ibid.
11 Abhijit Dutta, “A Different Imagination: Authenticity and Inauthenticity of Narrating Kashmir”, in Chinese Semiotic 
Studies (India), vol. 7, nº1, 2012, p. 171.
12 Irfan Ahmed & D. P. Saklani, “Evolution of Kashmiriyat, a Case of Socio-Cultural Assimilation During 14 th and 15th 
Century”, op. cit., p. 75
13 Ibid., p. 75.
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Kashmiriyat: multiple representations
For some scholars, Kashmiriyat was a synonym of cultural void and religious significance.
For a long time, this term became a binding force between the peoples of various religious
and cultures. Yet, now it is less encompassing because some of the groups (the Pandits) that
were  part  of  the  notion  Kashmiriyat have  fled  the  valley  after  the  first  set  of  violent
episodes14. Just as Kashmiri historian Mohammad Ishaq Khan explains:
“Our earnest participation in each other’s festivals and marriage ceremonies was proverbial until the
mass exodus of Pandits from their homeland, following the onset of militancy in Kashmir Valley in
1989.15”
For other scholars, Kashmiriyat was the mainstream definition of shared religiosity between
Hindus and Muslims. Kashmir was always portrayed as the best example of a place where
Hindus and Muslims could coexist in a peaceful way. Indeed, the region’s essence is a mix
of religious Hindu and Muslim costumes, beliefs, manners and rituals.16 In fact, this idea is
strongly supported by the Indian government as a mean to justify unity among Kashmiris. 
In his piece, Hangloo cites the work of T. N. Madan (a Kashmiri himself) who elaborately
describes the term Kashmiriyat17.  He clearly claims that Kashmiriyat constitutes of the key
elements of the love of the homeland (kashir) and common speech (koshur), besides similar
costumes and practices such as distribution of cooked and uncooked food as a token of
good will, visits to shrines and reverences to relics, similar culinary and sartorial styles,
folklore and folk music, etc.18 According to him, all of these elements have contributed to
create an image of mutual recognition and togetherness that can be perceived physically
and culturally. Indeed, the author accepts the fact that there is a secular trait in the nature of
the term Kashmiriyat. Yet, this has become more contestable after the unrest and growing
division of religious and cultural identities19.   
14 Neil Aggarwal, “Kashmiriyat as Empty Signifier”, op. cit., p. 227.
15 Mohammad Ishaq Khan, “Evolution of my Identity vis-à-vis Islam and Kashmir”, in Nyla Ali Khan et. al. (coords.), 
The Parchment of Kashmir, History, Society and Polity, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2012, p. 14. 
16 Neil Aggarwal, “Kashmiriyat as Empty Signifier, op. cit., p. 227.
17 Rattan Lal Hangloo, “Kashmiriyat: the voice of the past misconstrued”, op. cit., p. 38.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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Other authors such as M. I. Khan believe that  Kashmiriyat was the gradual outcome of
mutual  adaptation  of  various  pre-Islamic  religious  traditions  and  the  great  tradition  of
Islam. To him, the  Rishis (holy Vedic Hindu sage, saint or inspired poet) were the main
exemplars of the developing of such a dialectic process. In fact, the spirit of this dialectic
was mystical religious experience and universal love20. 
Regardless of the different opinions aforementioned, they all designate Kashmiriyat as an
“ideology” (an ideology is composed of three key elements: body of doctrine, myth and
belief)21. 
Another view is that Kashmiriyat is not an ideology, but rather a behavior pattern shared by
Pandits and Muslims in the region22.  Besides, Kashmiriyat is also perceived as the sense of
mutual support which still not wholly free of tensions.  In other words, this notion refers to
a pluralistic culture of tolerance, but does not represent syncretism.23 
On  the  other  hand,  Pakistan’s  government  defines  Kashmiriyat as  a  territorial
conceptualization  avoiding  a  cultural  or  religious  formulation24.  Thus,  this  means  that
Pakistan considers  Kashmiriyat as the equivalent to Kashmiri citizenship. This was first
proclaimed in 1858 by the Maharaja at the time. Besides, the Jammu and Kashmir kingdom
also granted citizenship to Kashmiris outside the land for two generations. Nowadays, the
Pakistani passport includes special certificates implying that such citizens are originally
from the Jammu and Kashmir province.25 
Recently, as a consequence of the crisis the Kashmiri region has been facing in the last few
decades,  there  has  been  new  and  more  radical  reinterpretations  of  the  notion  of
Kashmiriyat. Suhail Showkeen states that for the Pandits, the term became a curse because
the Pandits were living at the mercy of the Muslim majority and hence, becoming second-
class citizens26. Yet, this argument seems extremist to catch our attention, because it sounds
really alarming to realize that a culture is being subjugated by another one. After all, since
20 Ibid.
21 Dictionary.com, Ideology, available in http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ideology (consulted on April 23rd, 2017). 
22Rattan Lal Hangloo, “Kashmiriyat: the voice of the past misconstrued”, op. cit., p. 38.
23 Ibid., p. 39.
24 Neil Aggarwal, “Kashmiriyat as Empty Signifier, op. cit., p. 229
25 Ibid., p. 229.
26 Rattan Lal Hangloo, “Kashmiriyat: the voice of the past misconstrued”, op. cit., p. 39.
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Medieval  times,  most  people  converted  to  Islam  by  the  means  of  self-determination.
Indeed, only under the reign of Suha Bhatta people were forced to embrace Islam27. 
Is Kashmiriyat unbiased?
As stated by Hangloo, this is not just one neutral and innocent word. As a matter of fact,
this  term  is  a  powerful  socio-political  instrument  which  helps  to  identify  and  shape
different groups in the Kashmir area28. 
However, there is a lack of clear association between the term and the groups that pretend
to  belong  to  “Kashmiriyat”.  The  vagueness  of  the  term  itself  can  become  quite
controversial, since everyone in Kashmir can use it to outline a different political agenda29.
Moreover, due to its historical past, the use of Kashmiriyat cannot be attributed to any party
or specific religion, since it has been used by all of them disregarding their beliefs and
causes30.  
The use of the term Kashmiriyat as a political tool became very frequent during the late
1980’s when Kashmir faced its worst and bloodiest security crisis. Media and the different
actors would constantly invoke to the use of this notion because the use of the term became
essential to illustrate and have a better understanding of the various aspects of their agendas
31. 
As  mentioned  before,  defining  Kashmiriyat can  be  extremely  complex  because  of  its
vagueness.  Everyone can use the term according to their own view and interests while
claiming jurisdiction on Kashmir. In the following chapter I will analyze the cultural and
identity aspects that rely within the concept of Kashmiriyat.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 37.
29 Neil Aggarwal, “Kashmiriyat as Empty Signifier”, op. cit., p. 227.
30 Ibid., p. 229.
31 Ibid., p. 227.
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Chapter II. Kashmiriyat: culture and identity 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, many of the elements belonging to the concept of
Kashmiriyat are  cultural  aspects.  Kashmiriyat  was  the  result  of  shared  religiosity  and
cultural practices between Hindus and Muslims. Even though many centuries have passed
(and there is a religious difference among the diverse ethnic groups in Kashmir) most of the
Kashmiri  traditions  remain  very  close  to  their  original  form.  Indeed,  modernization  is
transforming costumes and rituals at a fast pace. However, the whole of the native people
(who call themselves Kashmiri) are trying to stick with their traditions.
For instance, when a child is born both Hindus and Muslims undertake similar rituals. First,
the new born will only be named after a certain amount of days (11 for Hindus and 7 for
Muslims) 32.  Second, once the name has been assigned,  they will  proceed to shave the
baby’s head and do some prayers to prevent any dreadful thing to occur to the child33.  This
is an example of how some commons elements in two distinct religions can become a
source of gathering rather than separation of cultures. 
Historical background
Just as aforementioned, most of this cultural legacy can be traced back to the early 13 th
century in Kashmir. It was during this period that Islam finally reached the Kashmir region.
There were several previous attempts by the Arabs and other Muslim people to conquer the
Kashmir region. However, the mountains served as natural barriers to keep away foreign
invaders34. In truth, there were invasion trials done during the Caliphate of Walid I (705-
715), yet, the Umayyad offensive fell short35.
During the 11th century, the Turks also attempted to invade India and failed. Some soldiers
decided to leave the army and remain in the Kashmir region36. These new inhabitants began
to give military assistance to Kashmiri rulers. In return, the authorities would allow them to
32 Somnath Wakhlu, The rich heritage of Jammu and Kashmir, studies in art, architecture, history and culture of the 
region, New Delhi, Gyan publishing house, 1998, pp. 241-43. 
33 Ibid.
34 Abdul Qaiyum Rafiqi, Sufism in Kashmir, from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, New Delhi, Bharatiya 
publishing house, 1971, p. 1.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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practice their own traditions freely, which were generally linked to the Sufi traditions from
Turkistan 37.  This also gave rise to having intra religious interactions. 
Indeed, the transition process from a Hindu kingdom to the first  sultanate  happened in
133938.  This  came  out  after  the  death  of  Hindu  King  Suhadeva  and  subsequently  his
brother. Since he did not have any heir to the throne, he appointed a loyal Muslim servant
as his successor: Shah Mir39. The outcome of the arrival of a Muslim to the throne was a
massive conversion of the region into Islam.  
The Muslim practices became quite appealing to the Kashmiris in a very short amount of
time.  This  was mainly linked with the fact  that  Islam was a suitable  alternative to  the
ongoing Medieval hierarchical Brahmanical society40. 
The  central  problem of  the  Brahmanical  society  was  that  its  socio-political  order  was
incredibly  elitist,  hierarchical,  privilege-based and  deeply grounded  into  an  unjust  cast
system41.   The  fact  that  Islam did  not  have  any hierarchy among  the  different  people
composing the society, made the religion appealing for those without privileges and for the
masses. 
Islam in Kashmir and the change in the cultural dynamics 
The interactions of the distinct cultures and religions with Islam changed completely the
cultural dynamics of the Kashmiri region. Indeed, we cannot deny the fact that Islam came
soon to be the dominant religion in the area. However, cross-cultural interactions were not
unusual  for  Kashmiri  people.  Buddhist  traits  among  Kashmiri  Shivaism  are  easily
distinguishable based on Trika philosophy42. This Buddhist thinking process emphasizes the
idea  of  experience,  reason  and  comprehension  in  the  course  of  realization  of  ultimate
reality43. 
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 1.
39 Ibid., p. 5.
40 Agnieszka Kuszewska, “Lal Ded: Kashmiri rebel saint-poetess and her legacy”, in Pakistan Vision, vol. 16, n°1, 2015, 
p. 3.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
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Likewise,  Sufi  practitioners  were  influenced by the  ascetic  and meditative  practices  of
Mahayana Buddhism44. The arrival of Sufi saints and missionaries marked the creation of a
new Sufi order within the sect. In this division, Sufi people would integrate traditions based
on Islam as well as former Buddhist and Hindu practices45. This assimilation and adaptation
mechanism  can  be  interpreted  as  the  Islamization  process  of  Kashmir  as  well  as  the
Kashmirization of Islam.   
Therefore,  just  as  Webb  states,  the  resultant  syncretic  Hindu-Muslim  culture  did  not
exclude the presence and influence of other religions, but rather led to the development of
indigenous philosophies, practices and traditions of Hinduism and Islam that differentiated
both religious communities from their counterparts elsewhere46. 
Besides,  Kashmir  was  a  hub  for  trade  between  the  East  and  the  West  (the  trade  was
primarily associated with the silk road), as well as a destination for many missionaries,
scholars, and travelers who also had their own impact on Kashmiri culture and identity47.
All the aforementioned elements contributed to shape the uniqueness of Kashmiri culture as
well as its own religious syncretism.   
Flows of trade and people led Kashmir to become region which had constant interactions
with diverse areas of the world. Hence, this territory became a true synonym of a mosaic of
tolerance  and  diversity  where  Muslims,  Hindus  and  Buddhists  were  able  to  coexist.
However,  in  the  late  90’s  when  the  security  crisis  unraveled,  the  ancient  practice  of
amicable religious steadiness began to fade away.  
Lalla Ded and the emergence of a syncretic identity 
Traditionally, the origins of such intra religious tolerance can be traced to the marvelous
works of a Sufi sage. Lalla Ded was one character which played a significant role in the
social revolution of 14th century in Kashmir. Ded was born in a Hindu Brahmin household,
where she was briefly educated and then forced to get married at age 12 according to the
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Matthew J. Webb, ”Nationalist Theories: Kashmiriyat”, Kashmir’s Right to Secede, a Critical Examination of 
Contemporary theories of secession, London, Routledge, 2012, p. 77.  
47 Agnieszka Kuszewska, “Lal Ded: Kashmiri rebel saint-poetess and her legacy”, op. cit., p. 3.
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tradition.  While  she  joined  the  new  household,  both  her  mother  in  law  and  husband
mistreated her48. 
The legend says she was half-fed and that she never complained about it. Instead of having
any sort of confrontation with her family, husband or mother in law, she decided to abandon
them and become a shelterless  mystic  without  any possessions,  wandering  in  rags  and
reciting poetry49.  
For a woman of that time, such decision was remarkable, indeed, very few people would
dare to fight against the system and confront religious beliefs.  She was very courageous to
renounce to all  the culturally imposed traditional role of self-sacrificing wife, leave her
family behind and enter the patriarchal world of metaphysical and poetic experiences50.
Undoubtedly, this woman chose the life of a rebel, especially since she was challenging the
educated Sanskrit  elite and the social system. Surely her conversion to Islam is a clear
confrontation towards the system. 
Kashmiris consider Ded as the mother of cultural and religious tolerance. Indeed, she was
the first registered historical character to have challenged and changed the dynamic in the
region.   In  fact,  Lalla  Ded  is  the  perfect  example  of  the  mainstream  definition  of
Kashmiriyat.  
Contesting the tolerance perspective
In his work, Matthew Webb quotes veteran Kashmiri commentator and activist Balraj Puri.
Puri gives a vast description of the evolution of coexistence among people in Kashmir. As
he declares: 
 “[…]  Kashmir  has  been  a  melting  pot  of  ideas  and  races.  It  received  every  new  creed  with
discrimination  and  enriched  it  with  its  own  contribution,  without  throwing  away  its  earlier
acquisitions.”51 
An interesting phenomenon is to observe the evolution of the concept of  Kashmiriyat in
different eras. Indeed, the identity of the people of Kashmir has changed in accordance with
48 Ibid., p. 1.
49 Ibid., p. 2.
50 Ibid.
51 Matthew J. Webb, ”Nationalist Theories: Kashmiriyat”, op. cit., p. 78.  
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the current trends and problems of every period. This is also related to the diverse political,
social  and  economic  state  Kashmiris  were  living  in.  Thus,  this  means  that  identity  is
malleable  and  hence  confirms  the  instrumentalist  perspective  (ethnicity  being  a
phenomenon which is socially constructed, malleable and situational) on ethnic identity and
collective mobilization52. The malleability of identity allows this feature to become a maker
for mobilization. But since it’s malleable, identity can also be demobilized.  Kashmiriyat
shares  both  characteristics.  For  centuries,  it  has  been  an  instrument  for  peaceful
understanding among cultures and religions. But lately  Kashmiriyat has also become an
instrument of mobilization. As Webb sates:
“Indeed, the historical evidence shows that any common national identity amongst the inhabitants of
the Valley has existed in a variety of forms, according to the social, political and economic status quo
of the time”53. 
At first glance, it might seem that peaceful coexistence among Kashmiris was viable and
uninterrupted until the early 90’s. It appears that there was unconditional regional unity and
intra religious tolerance, yet, boundaries still existed. Despite the fact of participating in
each  other’s  festivals  and  marriages,  weddings  outside  everyone’s  own  religious
community was unusual and not well perceived, even if it was not completely forbidden54. 
As a matter of fact, even if the common idea of sharing a regional identity persisted through
time,  little  by little,  a  religious  division  among  the  inhabitants  of  the  region  began  to
emerge (this phenomenon was more visible between Pandits and Muslims). Also, in the
view of rising nationalism during the 19th century, many political  leaders also began to
politicize the idea of Kashmiriyat.  Just as Webb claims:
“In the case of Kashmir, for example, the Valley’s inclusion within the Mughal, Afghan, Sikh and
Dogra  Empires,  significantly  affected  how  the  different  communities  that  comprised  Kashmiri
society saw themselves and related to one another vis-à-vis the government’s policies towards each
community.55”
52 Jugdep S. Chima, “Introduction”, in Jugdep S. Chima et. al. (coords.), Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South 
Asia, Identities, interests and challenges to state authority, London, Routledge, 2015, p. 3.
53 Ibid., p. 79.  
54 Irfan Ahmed, & D. P. Saklani, “Evolution of Kashmiriyat, a Case of Socio-Cultural Assimilation During 14 th and 15th 
Century”, op. cit., p. 75.
55 Matthew J. Webb, ”Nationalist Theories: Kashmiriyat”, op. cit., p. 82.  
17
All this evidence proves that there has been a dichotomy process undergoing since pre-
partition times (especially since the mid-19th century during the Dogra Empire to be more
precise). Both major religious groups started to drive apart and this is an additional reason
why there is also so much turmoil going on in Kashmir. How is it possible for them to
claim to have legitimate right to govern the state of Kashmir if there are divisions among
the people who seek to obtain independence from foreign yoke? Indeed, the fact that they
are not united under a single identity also weakens their negotiating position towards the
two major states occupying Kashmir. Moreover, both India and Pakistan have strong and
legitimate arguments over the sovereignty of the area which compete with those of the
Kashmiri people. In the following chapter I will present contrasting arguments used by the
actors involved in the dispute for the sovereignty of the territory.
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Chapter III. Multiple political narratives and diverse perspectives          
Many scholars  claim that  Kashmir  is  the  best  example  of  how decolonization  triggers
collateral effects. Indeed, many of the newly created states after decolonization in the mid-
20th century  had  multiethnicity  as  one  of  the  central  features  of  their  process.  Hence,
because of the diversity within these pluralistic societies, many sub-groups who enjoyed
relative  autonomy and  peace  during  colonial  rule  began to  experience  frictions  with  a
nascent highly-centralized government. 
Chima  suggests  that  the  departing  of  colonial  powers  (especially  the  British)  in  1947
defined  borders  between  various  emerging  countries  in  the  region56.  Such  political
imaginary lines were the point of departure to determine the power balance among ethnic
groups which composed the different multiethnic and newly independent states.  Therefore,
this diversity could potentially cause problems, since it could divide the loyalty between the
central  governments  and  local  nationalists  residing  in  the  region.  Some  could  opt  for
parochial ethnonationalism (claim for and independent state or portion of territory) on one
hand, and patriotism (loyalty to the central government) on the other57. 
Such theory can be linked to Donald L. Horowitz work on ethnic conflict. Indeed, in 1998
in  view of  the  Annual  World  Bank Conference  on  Development  Economics,  Horowitz
published  a  piece  entitled Structure  and  Strategy  in  Ethnic  Conflict.  Here  he  further
explored the different approaches of theories of ethnic conflict.58 
Kashmir: conflict in a multiethnic society 
As a matter of fact, this is what occurred with the Kashmiri region. Loyalties got divided
and the various ethnic groups expressed different claims and desires.  Moreover, let´s not
forget that the Kashmir region remains a disputed territory between India and Pakistan.
Even  if  there  has  been  bilateral  multilateral  cooperation  between  the  two  countries
(especially post 2003), this conflict continues to be unsolved.  Yet, if it  is true that this
56 Jugdep S. Chima, “Introduction”, op. cit., p. 1.
57 Ibid.
58 Donald L. Horowitz, “Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict”, in Annual World Bank Conference on Development 
Economics, Washington, 1998. 
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struggle  is  the  result  of  partition,  why  Kashmiris  did  not  raise  their  voice  during
decolonization and they only take actions nowadays after decades of peaceful coexistence? 
The  latest  Kashmiri  uprisings  are  linked  to  the  killing  of  Burhan  Wani  (a  young  and
charismatic Islamist militant) on July 9th, 2016 by the Indian security forces. Wani’s killing
triggered the mobilization of the youth which is a generation that had grown up under what
most Kashmiris consider illegitimate Indian occupation59. Indeed, the dead of such militant
fostered separatists’ hopes for a revival of their cause60. 
For this reason, it is utterly important to examine closely which arguments are used by each
actor involved in the conflict to claim entitlement on the Kashmir region. As Dutta declares,
the main problem of telling the narrative about Kashmir remains on ‘choosing sides’. On
the  one  hand,  an  Indian  citizen  is  convinced  that  Kashmir’s  place  lies  in  the  Indian
subcontinent. On the other hand, a Kashmiri person would still consider to be under the jug
of the Indian or Pakistani governments. Besides, Kashmiris consider themselves to be like
Israel and Palestine, in which the Indian and Pakistani states are instigating a new wave of
neo-colonialism61.
Therefore,  it  is  extremely complex  to  define  what  exactly  this  territory is  and  who  it
belongs  to  without  drawing  different  parallel  meaning  systems.  Another  frequent  issue
reckons that most of the narratives do not acknowledge ‘the other one´ that differ from their
point of view to fulfil their own agenda62. 
Variated sovereignty claims: Kashmiris, Indians and Pakistanis
We can state that there are three broad claims concerning the adscription of this territory:
the Kashmiris, the Pakistanis and the Indians. Every group uses their own arguments to
explain in which ways Kashmir should be part of their nation or territory. 
Kashmiri people strongly emphasize the fact that they have been under foreign rule since
the arrival of the Mughals in the 16th century. Almost all Kashmiri history literature points
out that the Mughals were tyrannical rulers which threatened the idea of  Kashmiriyat by
59The Economist, “Why Kashmir is erupting again”, op. cit., (Accessed on May 16th, 2017).
60 The Economist, “Kashmir reviving the cause”, available in http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21704828-turmoil-
kashmir-has-reopened-old-wound-and-hardened-anti-india-sentiment-pakistan-reviving (Accessed on May 16th 2017).
61 Abhijit Dutta, “A Different Imagination: Authenticity and Inauthenticity of Narrating Kashmir”, op. cit., p. 170.
62 Ibid. 
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factionalizing Hindu-Muslim and Shia-Sunni-Sufi practices63.  The most important desire of
the Kashmir inhabitants is to finally become independent and have self-rule64.  Surely, this
is a logical outcome drawn upon the historical past of being dominated by foreign rival
powers.
Just as Geelani posits: “Many independent polls and surveys have established that the majority of the
population of both sectors of Jammu and Kashmir prefer complete independence to direct rule by either India
or Pakistan.”65
Kashmiris like Oberoi believe that India and Pakistan are using a religious-racial card in
their favor when it comes to claim determination over the territory66. In fact, Kashmiris use
a very Primordialist perspective (meaning that ethnic identity flows from real or perceived
blood ties and extended kinship networks67) on the issue.  Certainly, they are presenting
Kashmiriyat as a “genetic predisposition” to favor their own kin for group survival68. 
However,  the  idea  of  Kashmiriyat minimizes  religious  divisions.  Therefore,  the
Primordialist argument is used as a symbol that emphasizes common history and belonging
and it also downplays the religious cleavage. Hence, Kashmiriyat is a form of syncretism or
fusion.
Besides, the inhabitants of the region constantly remind the Indian state the fact that they
should be able to decide about their political future as committed to them by the 1949 UN
resolution69. According to this resolution, the Indian state should hail a plebiscite in which
the  native  inhabitants  would  decide  about  the  political  future  of  Kashmir  (whether  to
become an independent state or to remain within the Indian or Pakistani states). However,
India never undertook such procedure and Kashmir just remained an annexed territory70. 
63 Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of belonging, Islam, regional identity, and the making of Kashmir, London, Hurst and 
Company, 2004, p. 29.  
64 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in conflict, India, Pakistan and the Unending War, London, 2003, p. 2. 
65 Gowhar Geelani, “Kashmir: The Forgotten Conflict”, Race and Class (Washington), vol. 56, nº2, 2014, p. 30.
66 Surinder Singh Oberoi, “Ethnic separatism and insurgency in Kashmir”, in Religious Radicalism and Security in South
Asia, Honolulu, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004, p. 172.
67 Jugdep S. Chima, “Introduction”, op. cit., p. 3.
68 Ibid.
69 Abdul Majid and Hussain Mahbood, “Kashmir: A Conflict between India and Pakistan”, in A Research Journal of 
South Asia Studies, vol. 31, nº1, 2016, p. 149. 
70 Ibid., p. 151.
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The  people  of  Kashmir  think  that  the  Indian  government  still  strongly  relies  in  the
Instrument of “Accession” (a pact signed by the Maharaja of the time to temporarily join
the Indian federation and in exchange for military help against Pakistani invasion) to avert
the independence of this territory71.  
Some  scholars  consider  that  the  Kashmiris  have  been  passive  actors  in  the  fight  for
sovereignty for the past centuries. However, Kashmir people have been politically active by
means  of  creating  intellectual  circles  and  narratives  of  their  ongoing situation.  Just  as
Zutshi declares: 
“[…]  the  inhabitants  of  Kashmir  were  not  merely  passive  victims  or  instruments  in  a  series  of  imperial
conquests. Rather, they were active, thinking participants who through the act of historical narration defined
Kashmir’s […] position within larger empires and their more immediate social contexts.72”
Currently, one of the biggest concerns of the Kashmiris is how to deconstruct Kashmir´s
foreign narratives.  It is undeniable that most literature on the matter is still being published
from  the  perspectives  of  Indian  and  Pakistani  scholars  and  the  Kashmiri  vision  is
minoritarian.73
Still and all, Kashmiris are starting to create a literature that depicts their own vision and
resistance to this dispute. Indeed, as stated beforehand, there was previously some scholarly
work done  in  the  subject,  yet,  it  was  only available  in  Kashmiri  and Urdu languages.
Hence,  this  made  the  understanding  of  the  matter  for  outsiders  quite  difficult  due  to
language barriers. However, writing about this topic continues to be a difficult task because
of constant surveillance and censorship from the ‘oppressor states’74.
The Pakistani state claims that Kashmir belongs to their territory based on the two-nation
theory (India for Hindus and Pakistan for Muslims). Indeed, it is not possible to deny the
fact that Kashmir has a Muslim majority. Therefore, Pakistan’s argument may have some
validity. Nonetheless, although most Kashmiris are Muslims, their practices differ in many
71 Fozia N. Lone, “The creation story of Kashmiri people: the right to self-determination”, in the denning law journal 
(England), vol.21, 2009, p. 5-6. 
72 Chitralekha Zutshi, Kashmir’s contested pasts: narratives, sacred geographies, and the historical imagination, New 
Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2014, p.4.
73 Gowhar Geelani, “Kashmir: The Forgotten Conflict”, op. cit., pp. 31-32. 
74 Ibid., p. 32.
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ways form the ones of Pakistan, and this could be the source of tensions in the future if the
territory was simply annexed75. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Kashmir’s Muslim practices are mainly linked to
the  Sufi  tradition.  Sufis  do  not  follow strict  orthodox  rules.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  their
philosophy is  a  belief  system and discipline  free  from the  confines  of  time and place,
composed  by  people  from  diverse  cultural  backgrounds  who  are  seeking  a  common
pathway to an eternal and transcendent truth76. 
Recently, Pakistan’s position  on  the  Kashmir  issue  has  evolved.  Presently, the  Foreign
Minister of Pakistan highlights the fact that it would be better to concede to the aspirations
of  independence  from  the  people  of  Kashmir.  Nonetheless,  this  should  always  be  in
accordance and acceptable for both India and Pakistan77. 
The government of Pakistan has stressed that they are willing to support Kashmir’s people
so  they  can  finally  achieve  self-determination78.  Such  declarations  have  been  quite
controversial and they have ignited a new source of tension in the relations between India
and Pakistan. In a sense, the Pakistani announcement means that it is almost consenting to
support rebellious and armed Kashmiri groups to achieve independence from India. 
Indeed, until the first years of the 21st century, Pakistan openly gave support to militants for
cross-border violence purposes. However, these actions declined considerably because of
their wish for acquiring a better international reputation as well as bettering their relations
with their Indian neighbor79. 
Just  like  Pakistan,  the  government  of  India  argues  that  they  have  different  reasons  to
declare Kashmir as part of their territory. In fact, India includes Kashmir as part of their
territory because it gives a lot of validity to the concept of  Kashmiriyat. This notion is a
clear  example  of  the  principles  of  the  founding  of  the  Indian  nation:  intra  religious
tolerance and peaceful coexistence in an ethno-religious diverse region80.  
75 Abdul Majid and Hussain Mahbood, “Kashmir: A Conflict between India and Pakistan”, op. cit., p. 149.
76 Nahid Angha, Practical Sufism and Philosophical Sufism, available in https://ias.org/sufism/practical-sufism-
philosophical-sufism/, (Accessed on April 24th, 2017). 
77 Aman M. Hingorani, Unravelling the Kashmir Knot, New Delhi, Sage, 2016, pp. 255-256.
78 Ibid., p. 256. 
79 The Economist, “Kashmir reviving the cause”, op. cit.
80 Abhijit Dutta, “A Different Imagination: Authenticity and Inauthenticity of Narrating Kashmir”, op. cit., p. 173.
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Such  argument  based  on  unitary  nationalism,  overlaps  with  another  aspect  of  Indian
society: a highly-federalized nationalism based on regionalized and plural identities81. Such
contradictions  can cause frictions among the central  government  and other groups who
enjoyed previously relative autonomy. 
Furthermore, allowing the independence of Kashmir would also mean losing aesthetic and
cultural values of the Indian nation. India would lose a precious natural and cultural jewel.
The beauty of the valley was being depicted in poetry since medieval times.  The most
famous Sanskrit corpus being the Rajatarangini (River of Kings) by Kalhana, tells the story
of the origins of Kashmir (as being one lake in the middle of the mountains) to the ongoing
medieval battles between kings and queens for the throne82.  Besides, Persian authors also
portrayed the charms of the region during Mughal times83. However, during the 60’s, there
was a strong emphasis from the government to portray the beauty of the region. It was not
only home for Mughal rulers who created beautiful gardens, but nowadays it has been also
home  for  the  cinema  industry  which  reinforced  the  idea  of  Kashmir  as  a  sacred  and
mystical mountainy land84. 
Besides, as Majid and Mahbood state, the main concern of India relies on the fact that by
letting Kashmir go, other states would also wish the same treatment and hence, there would
be fragmentation of the country85. The Indian central government fears the fact of having to
accept the independence of more states such as the northeastern ones, Tamil Nadu or even
Punjab. This would be a big threat to national unity and the government cannot allow such
crisis to unravel86. 
However, the Indian state strongly highlights its wish to solve the Kashmir issue especially
because they are eager to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. One of
the pre-conditions for finally being granted access to it would be to find a viable solution to
81 Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of belonging, Islam, regional identity, and the making of Kashmir, op. cit., p. 3.  
82 Chitralekha Zutshi, “Translating the Past: Rethinking Rajatarangini, Narratives in Colonial India”, in The Journal of 
Asian Studies (Cambridge), vol. 70, n°1, 2011, p. 6.
83 Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of belonging, Islam, regional identity, and the making of Kashmir, op. cit., p. 30.  
84 Ibid., p. 173.
85 Abdul Majid and Hussain Mahbood, “Kashmir: A Conflict between India and Pakistan”, op. cit., p. 151. 
86 Ibid.
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the Kashmir dispute.  This makes the independence of Kashmir an option, albeit not the
preferred one87. 
Neighboring rivalry 
Beyond doubt,  Kashmir  regional  dispute  is  also  a  matter  of  rivalry between India  and
Pakistan88. Such rivalry is rooted to the construction of the South Asian subcontinent itself.
Both countries are seeking to control the region to prove that they have more leverage than
the other neighbor89. In fact, the dispute of this territory is a battleground between different
ideologies. Just as Zutshi declares: “[…] borderlines are defined as middle grounds where
imperial competition and negotiations among a variety of imperial and indigenous actors
led to the production of distinct political cultures”90. 
Yet,  the  way both  countries  have  handled  their  politic-military  relations  highlights  the
difference in state priorities as well as the importance of the role of the military91.   As
Ganguly declares:  
“[…]  Apart  from a  small  handful  of  instances,  the  Indian  military  has  played  little  or  no  role
whatsoever in the formulation of India’s foreign and security policies. […] In Pakistan matters have
worked in reverse. The military has challenged, supported and dismissed governments as and when
they have deemed necessary.”92
External interventions and terrorism in Kashmir
Terrorism has become a major issue in the negotiations that are looking for a long-lasting
settlement to this conflict. Peace keeping in the region is fundamental to reach a consensus,
but this can only be achieved if terrorism is brought to an end. Terrorism is not only costly
because  it  damages  infrastructure,  but  it  also  takes  the  lives  of  innocent  people.  Most
important, terrorism brings uncertainty a crucial factor that needs to be mastered to bring a
87 Shah Rukh Hashmi, “India’s Obsession: The Security Council and Kashmir”, in The Diplomatic Insight, 2016.  
88 Sumit Ganguly, Deadly Impasse, Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2016, p. 3.
89 Ibid., p. 2.
90 Chitralekha Zutshi, “Rethinking Kashmir’s history from a borderlands perspective”, in History Compass, vol.8, n°7, 
2010, p. 594.  
91 Sumit Ganguly, Deadly Impasse, Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century, op. cit., p. 16.
92 Ibid.
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stable and durable peace. Putting an end to terrorism is a must in the process of peace
keeping. 
However,  fighting  terrorism is  an  extremely  complicated  task.  The  nature  and  modus
operandi of terrorism is invisible and unexpected and hence makes it difficult to track or
avoid. Indeed, only using intelligence or military counterattacks might not be the optimal
solution. In order to finally start to end with such attacks one needs to further explore and
understand the motivation of such groups to opt for violent means. 
Many international peace keeping organizations and other powers have participated to put
an end to terrorism. Indeed, there has been American intervention several times in Kashmiri
ground.  The American presence was more noticeable during the Clinton administration and
just after the 9/11 and in the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan93. 
The American government strongly condemns terrorist acts and hence declared war against
terror.  Likewise,  India  and  Pakistan  followed  the  trend  set  by  the  US since  terrorism
became  prominent  in  Kashmir94.   After  the  9/11  attacks  and  the  2003  relations
improvement, both India and Pakistan have also declared war on terrorism and are starting
to collaborate to maintain some sort of peace and stability in the region95. 
In Kashmir, militancy per se has always existed. Yet, it became a dominant trend in the late
1980’s and early 1990’s. Indeed, militancy related to the Indo-Pak neighboring rivalry has
become prevalent among many groups and this has led to Kashmir’s most violent set of
riots. 
However,  militancy in  Kashmir  is  not  exclusive  to  one  particular  group96.  In  fact,  the
militant’s agendas have evolved with time and we can broadly see that there are three main
phases in the contemporary dynamics of the conflict: the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
front (JKLF) period, the Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen (HM) and the involvement of other foreign
groups97. 
93 Rahnam Indurthy and Muhammad Haque, “The Kashmir conflict: why it defies solution”, op. cit., p. 13. 
94 Ibid., p. 14
95 Ibid., p. 17.
96 Deepti Sharma, “The Kashmir insurgency: multiple actors, divergent interests, institutionalized conflict”, in Chima, 
Jugdep S. et. al. (coords.), Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia, Identities, interests and challenges to state 
authority, London, Routledge, 2015, p. 26.
97 Ibid.
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In view of an extremely turbulent political scenario in 1987, militancy seemed to be the
option to cope with the fact of raising Kashmiri voice of discontent with the management
and latest policies executed by the Indian government. Surely, at this point one can see that
Kashmiris actively declared to be in favor of becoming independent.  
Pakistan viewed these insurgencies as an opportunity to destabilize the Indian government 
and have wider influence (even control) over the area. Yet, Pakistan did not foresee that its 
actions in the Kashmiri territory would backfire, and that terrorism would remain on their 
borders causing major disturbances.  For a while, the Pakistani government through the 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) decided to train and equip several terrorist groups that 
operated in Kashmir (including those related to the JKLF and the HM)98.
Terrorist Training camps in Pakistan, Anne Noronha Dos Santos, Military Intervention and Secession in South
Asia, the cases of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir and Punjab, p. 85.
98 Ibid., p. 27.
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Figure 5.2 Training Camps in Pakista
n
The history of JKLF and HM is heavily intertwined.  In  1989,  the urban,  middle-class,
secular and pro-independence JKLF group was founded99. This group was the most popular
among the masses due to its ability for grassroots mobilization100. Nevertheless, due to the
diversity  of  ideologies  that  emerged  alongside  the  JKLF, this  group  could  not  remain
unified for more than 10 years101.  
Since the JKLF had a secular doctrine, more radical secessionists leaders decided to create
an alternative group in 1995 to cope with this issue102. Hence, the founding of the HM
seems to be a logical outcome for pursuing more Islamic agenda.  This  group not only
highlighted the importance of Islam, but also advocated the merger with Pakistan103. 
Terrorism began to expand because of Pakistan’s support for extremist groups such as HM
and because of the Islamization of the conflict104. Nowadays, the main concern remains on
how to deal with terrorists which were heavily supported from abroad and do not even
share the Kashmiri cause of self-rule. These groups that once were trained and backed by
foreign countries are the ones who bring the most instability in the region105.
In fact, many terrorist groups residing in Kashmir are there just to fulfil a pan-Islamic and
jihadi  perspective  of  uniting  the  Muslims  of  the  world  and  to  finally  establish  a
Caliphate106. Since the late 1990’s, groups with links to Al Qaeda such as the Lashkar-e-
Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA), are participating in
terrorist activities in Kashmir.107. 
As shown, there is a vast variety of narratives that have been built to explain the Kashmiri
struggle. Yet, I strongly believe that the region should use a democratic method and rely on
the opinion of the vast majority its native people. In Kashmir, many issues remain unsolved
99 Matthew J. Webb,” Nationalist Theories: Kashmiriyat”, op. cit., p. 44.  
100 Deepti Sharma, “The Kashmir insurgency: multiple actors, divergent interests, institutionalized conflict”, op. cit., p. 
26.
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104 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
105 Ibid., p. 29.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
28
Pakista
n
(autonomy vs full independence, control by one or two nations, division among religious
and  ethnic  cleavages,  difference  in  cultural  and  religious  practices,  terrorism  vs.
peacekeeping etc.) and this triggers the question if there can be an end to this circle. In the
following chapter  I  will  discuss whether  there is  a  viable  solution for this  long-lasting
dispute.
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Chapter IV. Towards conflict resolution?
The puzzling issue about the Kashmiri dispute is why does this conflict does not seem to
have a  voice of its  own (or  in  the international  realm) to  finally reach a  peaceful  and
consensus solution?  There are many hypotheses that have been raised on the matter.  For
example,  some  scholars  think  that  the  lack  of  intervention  from  the  international
community is a way for pleasing India who is becoming an emerging power. Others think
that the issue does not raise enough interest for major powers and multilateral organizations
that act as peace keepers108. As Geelani states in his article, Kashmir has really become a
ghost among international conflicts109.  
While the general idea of the conflict is that it’s a territorial dispute between India and
Pakistan, Kashmiris must face the fact that they live in a highly-militarized area. One of the
recurring issues of militancy eruption in Kashmir has resulted in the mobilization large
scale security forces110. Such security groups generally come from different ethnic origins
which automatically makes them to have lesser empathy towards the local population. In
the long run, this can make the violent events even more complex and dangerous111. 
Let´s  point  out  that  there  has  not  been  any active  participation  from the  international
community after the creation of the special UN branch for the Kashmir crisis in 1948 112.
The UN created resolutions calling to undertake referenda in 1948 and 1958, but both failed
to materialize, since India and Pakistan did not agree on the terms113. 
 This seem to validate Geelani’s argument on the incapability of Kashmiri people to do a
‘good marketing’ on their cause. Thus, if there was a change in the way Kashmiris frame
108 Ibid., p. 30.
109 Ibid.
110 Noor Ahmad Baba, “Resolving Kashmir: imperatives and solutions”, op. cit., p. 71.  
111 Ibid. 
112 Gowhar Geelani, “Kashmir: The Forgotten Conflict”, op. cit., p. 30.
113 Rahnam Indurthy and Muhammad Haque, “The Kashmir conflict: why it defies solution”, in International op. cit., p.
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their claims this could attract a wider worldwide public and create awareness of this issue
one more time114. 
Hindrances to Kashmiri secession 
Nonetheless, having a minimal internal consensus over the state’s independence is quite a
complex issue. Even within the Kashmiri state, there is a large division on the ways the
state can finally become independent. This is linked with the fact that every different region
has contrasting perspectives on how to handle this issue and on the possible result of the
final outcome. 115
Kashmir and its main administrative divisions, source: Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of belonging, Islam, 
regional identity, and the making of Kashmir, p. 10.
First, the lack of unity among religious groups make us question one more time whether
independence could be possible especially since there is an ongoing adversarial relation
among Hindus and Muslims from Kashmir. Both religious groups blame one another for
being the reason of their oppression. Just as Zutshi suggests:
114 Gowhar Geelani, “Kashmir: The Forgotten Conflict”, op. cit., p. 34.
115 Shaheen Akhtat, “Intra Kashmir Dialogue: Need for Consensus”, in Strategic Studies (USA), vol. 32, 2012, p. 1. 
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“Unfortunately, what these debates invariably end up doing is casting the present conflict in Kashmir
in terms of an inevitable struggle between Hindus and Muslims, whether an oppressive Hindu state
and its victimized Muslim citizens, or a dominant majority Muslim community and persecuted Hindu
minorities.116” 
Second, as mentioned previously, there is a lack of unity among the people of Kashmir
within the realm of defining a minimal and viable political agenda. Each ethnic group has
different desires when it comes to decide about the future of the state. 
The valley (having a Muslim majority) is the area which has always defended the idea of
azadi (independence).  In  this  area,  the  key  figure  when  it  comes  to  negotiation  and
promotion of the Kashmiri struggle is the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). This
party (also considered as a separatist umbrella) composed by several secessionist groups
claims the right to self-determination in accordance with the UN resolutions of 1948117.
However, despite the will of solving the issue, there has been little dialogue between New
Delhi and the APHC118.
Other militant groups such as the Hizb or the United Jihad Council (UJC) located in the
valley  believe  that  it  would  be  better  for  the  Kashmiri  people  to  be  pro-accession  to
Pakistan.  Even  if  these  groups  are  considering  being  part  of  Pakistan,  the  Pakistani
government still supports the idea of an independent Kashmiri state119. 
Pro Indian parties such as the National Conference (NC) (located in Srinagar) stress the
need for a greater autonomy from the Indian state by recurring to article 370 of the Indian
Constitution120. In 2002, the People’s democratic party (PDP) came to power in Kashmir
and became crucial in the change of political dynamics in the state121. 
This party was founded in 1999 by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed (who was first affiliated with
the National Congress under the Rajiv Gandhi government) after the NC was losing ground
116 Chitralekha Zutshi, Kashmir’s contested pasts: narratives, sacred geographies, and the historical imagination, op. cit.,
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120 Ibid., p. 2.
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after creating an alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (moderate Hindu political
party). The constant clashes with Delhi in the discussion of the article 370 and lack of
progress in the negotiations made the NC quite unpopular in a very short amount of time.
This lead to the creation of the PDP which would be a new avatar in politics representing a
pro-Kashmir shift122.
The main concerns of the party were to operate on the ideology of self-rule and to build a
bridge between the local population (which was being affected by the security crisis) and
the central government123. This would be done by mobilizing public opinion to persuade the
central government to get a peaceful resolution by using constitutional means and to restore
normalcy in Kashmir. Indeed, such philosophy made the PDP a strong force which remains
in power until date124. 
In Jammu, there is  also a demand for having complete autonomy by asking for punun
Kashmir (Hindu Kashmir)125. Pandits demand to go back to their home which they were
forced to leave in the 90’s. In the Ladakh region (divided between the Buddhist dominated
Leh and the Muslim dominated Kargil), Buddhists have advanced some proposals on how
to coexist despite their religious divides126. 
Nowadays, the biggest concern regarding secession lies on the fact that there is a lack of
viable political agenda or a strong leadership that could rally the different groups around
this agenda. The APHC or the NC who once enjoyed popularity are now not being able to
claim support from the people due to their incapability to deliver promises on more down to
earth political policies like more schools, roads, hospitals and jobs127. 
Besides, even if the PDP emerged as the single largest party in the Assembly polls of the
2014 election, the party did not manage to have a majority to form a government of its own.
Hence, the PDP had to create a coalition with the BJP which was the second largest party at
the Assembly128. 
122 Ibid., (consulted June 14th, 2017).
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However, Mufti did not realize that by creating such coalition, many Kashmiris would not
be pleased129. Indeed, the main reason why people voted for Mufti was because he was
supposed to make sure that no Indian political party became a partner in power (especially
the  BJP  ruling  in  the  valley  would  be  quite  controversial).  Certainly,  the  conflicting
ideologies of the parties would create greater repercussions on peace keeping in Kashmir130.
Without doubt, these circumstances and (once again) the lack of progress in negotiations is
putting  in  stake  the  credibility  of  the  PDP. Therefore,  the  other  viable  alternative  to
circumvent corrupt politicians might seem religious groups with strong principles. Hence, it
might sound logical to follow the steps of a character such as Burhan Wani.  However,
Hangloo finds flaws in the arguments given by Kashmiri religious separatists because they
do not have any substantive political goals.131
Resolution drafting: a palette of options
Even  though  many  international  organizations  have  drawn  documents  with
recommendations  to  improve  the  situation  and  reach  consensus,  little  has  been
implemented. Old proposals written in the late 90’s and early 00’s keep coming repeatedly
suggesting the demilitarization of the region as well as having freedom of speech, freedom
of movement and justice for all victims of human rights violations132. 
Thanks to social media, many cases of abuses are now registered and distributed to the
public  even  if  there  is  a  continuous  risk  of  threats  and  censorship133.  Human  rights
violations  have  only fueled  Kashmiri  will  for  independence.  Hence,  there  are  constant
active demonstrations against the Indian forces134.  
For the past seven decades, there have been many propositions to reach a final consensus
over this regional dispute.  National and international organizations and civil society actors
have proposed different alternatives to solve this complex problem. 
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The first solution was the 1948 referendum offered by India. Such option was given in the
framework of partition (where princely states could opt to be incorporated to India or to
Pakistan)135. India agreed to help Kashmir against Pakistani invasion, if they would sign the
Instrument of accession. The state would enjoy certain autonomy which was supported by
the creation of article 370 of the Indian constitution136. 
According to what was originally planned, once tensions between Pakistan and India would
diminish and a  more normalized  situation between the  two states,  they could envisage
another referendum (where the local people would determine what was to happen with
Kashmir). Yet, the constant military collisions did not allow to undertake such an action. In
1949,  the  UN requested  the  central  government  of  India  to  execute  such  referendum,
nevertheless, this never occurred137. 
With  the  failure  of  the  referendum,  Owen  Dixon  envisaged  a  second  ‘more  realistic’
middle-way resolution in 1950138. Dixon based his proposition in view of the plurality that
resides within Kashmir offering an institutional solution by creating cohabitation rules. He
suggested different options for the three broad divisions in the state139. 
He first proposed the formation of a coalition government between the different parties and
actors140. The second proposition was to create an administration in which people outside
politics  would  hail  high  judicial  and  administrative  positions141.  The  chairman  of  the
administration would be pointed out by the UN and half of the members should represent
Hindus and the other half Muslims (such power sharing government was also the initial
commitment of the Indian independence fighters  prior opting for creating two different
nations). The last resolution consisted of having an administration only composed entirely
by UN representatives142.
The third proposal made by several scholars and Kashmiris was creating a confederation or
a  condominium  status  for  Kashmir  in  relation  with  India  and  Pakistan.  Even  Sheikh
135 Noor Ahmad Baba, “Resolving Kashmir: imperatives and solutions”, op. cit., p. 74.
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Mohammed  Abdullah  (who  was  Kashmir’s nationalist  leader)  was  a  supporter  of  this
idea143. Central government matters should be handled by both India and Pakistan jointly
through the Council  of Common Interest  (CCI)144.  Such council  would have to include
Kashmiris from both sides of the line of control (which would have to be softened) and
create policies which would be satisfactory everyone145. 
This idea was further developed by Kashmiri intellectuals in the 1990’s after the eruption of
the bloodiest security crisis in Kashmir. The most important set of intellectuals is the US
based group called the Kashmir study group (KSG) lead by Farooq Kathwari146.  
The  KSG was  formed  by 25  members  who developed  a  set  of  three  different  studies
offering solutions over this issue. These documents were entitled as  A Way Forward in
Kashmir. These ideas were reformulated since the proposal sounded quite unrealistic at the
time. In 2005, a second version of such draft was presented and called  Kashmir a Way
Forward  147.
In this document, the intellectuals suggested that portions of the former princely state of
Kashmir had to be reconstituted into self-governing entities enjoying free access to one
another and to and from both India and Pakistan. The document recommends the creation
of five autonomous entities: Kashmir, Jammu, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir and northern areas.
Each entity would have its own constitutions as well as citizenship, flag and legislature.  In
addition to the autonomous states, there must be a creation of an All-Kashmir executive
body which represents each one of the different areas as well as India and Pakistan. Such
institution would coordinate issues such as regional trade, tourism, environment and water
resources. No army should reside in the territory and the parent states (India and Pakistan)
should be in charge of defending the territories if required148. 
Sajjad Gani Lone also created a similar 268-page vision document (which latter inspired
Musharraf’s) entitled Achievable Nationhood. The author envisages the development of a
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Kashmir  borderless  economic  union.  This  would  be  jointly  managed  with  India  and
Pakistan in the realm of defense and foreign affairs in their respective areas of the state149. 
This means that there would be a shared sovereignty between the different states. They
would be able to have and independent relationships with each other converting the region
in a neutral peace zone150. New institutions would be created in order to organize, consult
and collaborate in the fields of immigration, interior resident movement, natural resources
management and sector specific cooperation151. 
Musharraf’s proposition  is  also  quite  similar  to  Gani´s  but  more  specific  since  it  puts
forward the fact of having a need for different interpretations depending on each region.
This is because of the ethnic, political and strategic considerations exclusive to every area.
The government should provide different appointments  between one another as well  as
different political exceptions modelled in some sort of federalism152.
Baba suggests that the key element to solve this conflict is to start softening the border
between India and Pakistan153.  Due to partition in 1947, the main communication paths
were cut and regular trade routes could not operate any longer. Kashmir who was once part
of the silk route trade spots, stopped interacting with the rest of its Asian trade partners154. 
Alternative routes had to be used, but these paths could not handle the number of vehicles
that circulated in the Kashmiri region before partition, neither the climate conditions were
optimal for goods transportation in these alternate routes.  Besides, the constant military
checkpoints and the new tedious paperwork required made trade decrease substantially.
Therefore, Kashmir became a periphery that was no longer connected to the rest of Asia
and this took a tremendous toll in the economy to the extent of getting a strong setback155.  
Reopening the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route would permit Kashmiri products to become
internationally competitive as well as to regain access to routes towards central Asia and
149 Ibid.  
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even  Iran156.  Besides,  softening  borders  with  Pakistan  would  not  only  improve  the
economy. This would also mean that it could help counterbalance the expanding Chinese
commercial influence over the Asian continent157. 
Webb points out that militancy and violent rebel groups in Kashmir (just as in other parts of
India)  are  also  linked  to  the  insufficient  amount  of  opportunities158.  Baba  claims  that
militancy is the result of the failure of normal and peaceful channels to express dissent159.
Also, the fact that militia breaks down civil order, destroys infrastructure and causes the
erosion of public institutions further damages the economic potential of the region. Hence,
this seems to be creating a vicious cycle in which the central government of India and the
people of Kashmir are not able to improve the situation in the zone160. 
If  Kashmir  wishes  to  become  autonomous,  the  Kashmiri  leaders  should  reformulate  a
viable solution which takes into consideration the diversity existing within the region. The
different  ethnicities and religious  groups should enjoy certain degree of equality in  the
realm of the trias politica representation in order to avoid any further violent developments.
Indeed, the suggested conflict resolutions for this issue are variated and even unusual. The
condominium case sounds as a quite promising resolution, especially since it would grant a
certain degree of autonomy to the Kashmiri state, and there would be shared sovereignty
with the parent states and hence, territorial dispute would stop. Such option is a peculiar but
interesting suggestion for such a complex and exceptional turmoil. 
Besides,  other lessons and resolutions could be drawn from other multiethnic countries
which have faced similar situations. For instance, Sri Lanka managed to end its civil war
after 26 years of armed conflict161. Sri Lanka had a similar historical background in which
through the years, certain political reforms to improve the status of the Tamil minority vis-
156 Ibid., p. 72.
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à-vis the  Sinhala  majority  were  not  executed  and  this  triggered  the  development  of  a
secessionist movement in the late 70’s162.
Just as in Kashmir, when the means of a pacific movement did not work, violence became
the mean for raising their voice. Nowadays, the Sinhala country seems to be blossoming
after this long-lasting struggle. In the same way, I believe that there is hope for Kashmir for
a  peaceful  resolution  in  which  the  population  would  enjoy  of  the  benefits  of  peace,
autonomy and economic development. 
162 Ibid., p. 291.
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Conclusion
Under the current circumstances it is very difficult to foresee if there will be a long-lasting
solution to this protracted conflict. Indeed, I cannot deny the fact that there have been great
efforts among all the actors involved to try to find a shared and acceptable result for all.
Yet, there are still many pending matters to be solved. 
It seems that under the current state of affairs in the area, a solution is far from being
decisive. However, it is of utmost importance to highlight that now more than ever, India
and Pakistan are willing to cooperate as a way to preclude religious and terrorist groups
using the secession claims as a way to implement their more radical agendas. 
Controlling the Kashmiri conflict has been costly for the central governments of India and
Pakistan but especially for the local inhabitants. Thousands of Kashmiri lives have been
lost in the process of defending their ideals and their ways of life. In times of crisis, states
of exceptions are often implemented and hence, these situations of exception are prone to
commit many atrocities against human life and integrity.
Yet, one can question whether independence would be a viable option for Kashmiris. Many
scholars argue that the fact that there is so much fragmentation among the local inhabitants
could cause a post-independence civil war. Kashmiris are not only politically divided, but
also ethnically and religiously.
Besides, as mentioned previously, the economy of the region is extremely fragile.  Militia
work and the constant riots have made of Kashmir a faded spot in commercial routes. In a
way, the local economy has almost stagnated for the past three decades due to destruction
and lack of investment in infrastructure created by an uprising of insecurity in the zone. 
I believe that the most viable solution would be to implement the in between condominium
arrangement  with  help  of  the  international  community  as  well  as  a  border  softening.
Nowadays,  the  concept  of  security  is  not  exclusive  to  one  single  nation.  It  challenges
countries to come together for common rather than individual purposes163. The main idea is
to create a similar institution to the European Union in which territorial claims would not
163 Noor Ahmad Baba, “Resolving Kashmir: imperatives and solutions”, op. cit., p. 68.  
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be a  problem because of  the  political  flexibility provided by the  modus operandi of  a
confederation164.
After 1998 (when India and Pakistan were on the brink to have a nuclear war) and despite
all the ongoing tensions among the actors involved, there has been awareness that the only
viable solution for this  conflict  is  the mean of a  dialogue165.   A nuclear  war  would be
disastrous, especially since it would erase the region from the map. Besides’ it would be an
ecological and economic catastrophe in which neither of the countries could afford to repay
the damage. 
Kashmiris are eager to finally live in their homeland where terrorism and human rights
abuses  are  over,  where  fundamental  rights,  water,  shelter,  education,  healthcare  are
provided166. However, this can only be achieved when parent states agree on a final and
long-lasting solution and good governance is applied. This implies that the current people
in power in all three nations need to change their policies and be inclined to help the native
people.  
What I consider to be the first and most prominent issue is to finally manage to at least
avoid  bloodthirsty  by  softening  borders,  demilitarizing  the  zone  and  creating  a  safe
environment. This would immediately foster the development of local economy and hence,
it could make the region sustainable and avert another violent conflict. Since both countries
have declared war on terrorism after the 9/11 events, collaboration to combat such groups
should not be a problem anymore. Making the zone safe again is a must to finally have
peace in the region.  
164 Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari, “Managing the Kashmir conflict: a collaborative approach op. cit., p. 155.
165 Noor Ahmad Baba, “Resolving Kashmir: imperatives and solutions”, op. cit., p. 70.
166 Ibid., p. 68.
41
Bibliography
Secondary sources
Books and articles
Aggarwal, Neil, “Kashmiriyat as Empty Signifier”, in  Interventions (USA), vol. 10, n°2,
2008, pp. 222-235. 
Ahmed,  Irfan  &  Saklani,  D.  P.,  “Evolution  of  Kashmiriyat,  a  Case  of  Socio-Cultural
Assimilation During 14th and 15th Century”  in Remarking an Analisation  (India), vol. 1,
n°8, 2016, pp. 73-78.
Akhtat,  Shaheen,  “Intra  Kashmir  Dialogue:  Need  for  Consensus”,  in  Strategic  Studies
(USA), vol. 32, 2012, pp. 1-15. 
Angha,  Nahid,  Practical  Sufism  and  Philosophical  Sufism,  available  in
https://ias.org/sufism/practical-sufism-philosophical-sufism/, (Consulted April 24th, 2017).
Baba, Noor, Ahmad, “Resolving Kashmir: imperatives and solutions”, in  Race and Class
(Washington), vol. 56, n°2, 2014, pp. 66-80.  
Bukhari,  Syed,  Shahid,  Hussain,  “Managing  the  Kashmir  conflict:  a  collaborative
approach”, in Journal of the research society of Pakistan, vol.53, n°1, 2016, pp. 149-158.
Chima, Jugdep S., Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia, Identities, interests and
challenges to state authority, London, Routledge, 2015.
Dictionary.com,  Ideology,  available  in  http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ideology
(consulted on April 23rd, 2017). 
Dos Santos, Anne Noronha, Military Intervention and Secession in South Asia, the cases of
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir and Punjab, USA, Prager Security International, 2007.
Dutta,  Abhijit,  “A Different  Imagination:  Authenticity  and  Inauthenticity  of  Narrating
Kashmir”, in Chinese Semiotic Studies (India), vol. 7, n°1, 2012, pp. 168-183. 
Ganguly, Sumit, Deadly Impasse, Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Geelani, Gowhar, “Kashmir: The Forgotten Conflict”,  Race and Class (Washington), vol.
56, n°2, 2014, pp. 29-40.  
42
Gupta, Sisir, Kashmir a study in India-Pakistan relations, London, Asia Publishing house,
1965.
Hangloo, Rattan, Lal, “Kashmiriyat: the voice of the past misconstrued”, in Nyla Ali Khan
et.  al. (coords.),  The  Parchment  of  Kashmir,  History,  Society  and  Polity, Palgrave
Macmillan, UK, 2012, pp. 37-68.
Hashmi,  Shah  Rukh,  “India’s  Obsession:  The  Security  Council  and  Kashmir”,  in  The
Diplomatic Insight, 2016.  
Hingorani, Aman, M., Unravelling the Kashmir Knot, New Delhi, Sage, 2016.
Horowitz, Donald L., “Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict”, in  Annual World Bank
Conference on Development Economics, Washington, 1998. 
Indurthy, Rahnam and Haque, Muhammad, “The Kashmir conflict: why it defies solution”,
in International Journal on World Peace (USA), vol. 28, n°1, 2010, pp. 9-40. 
Khan, Mohammad, Ishaq, “Evolution of my Identity vis-à-vis Islam and Kashmir”, in Nyla
Ali Khan et. al. (coords.), The Parchment of Kashmir, History, Society and Polity, Palgrave
Macmillan, UK, 2012, pp. 13-36. 
Kuszewska,  Agnieszka,  “Lal  Ded:  Kashmiri  rebel  saint-poetess  and  her  legacy”,  in
Pakistan Vision (Pakistan), vol. 16, n°1, 2015, pp. 1-9.
Lone, Fozia, N., “The creation story of Kashmiri people: the right to self-determination”, in
the denning law journal (England), vol.21, 2009, pp. 1-25. 
Majid, Abdul and Mahbood Hussain, “Kashmir: A Conflict between India and Pakistan”, in
A Research Journal of South Asia Studies, vol. 31, n°1, 2016, pp. 149-159. 
Maqbool,  Mudasir,  Political  Journey  of  PDP in  Jammu  and  Kashmir ,  available  in
https://kashmirobserver.net/2016/features/political-journey-pdp-jammu-and-kashmir-11999
(consulted June 14th, 2017).
Mathur,  Shubh,  “Memory  and  hope:  New  Perspectives  on  the  Kashmir  conflict-  an
introduction”, in Race and Class (Washington), vol. 56, n°2, 2014, pp. 4-12.  
Oberoi,  Surinder,  Singh,  “Ethnic  separatism and  insurgency in  Kashmir”,  in  Religious
Radicalism and Security in South Asia, Honolulu, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
2004, pp. 171-191.
Rafiqi, Abdul Qaiyum, Sufism in Kashmir, from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, New
Delhi, Bharatiya publishing house, 1971.
43
Rai,  Mridu,  Hindu  rulers,  Muslim  subjects,  Islam  rights,  and  the  history  of  Kashmir,
Princeton, Princeton University press, 2004. 
Schofield,  Victoria,  Kashmir  in  conflict,  India,  Pakistan  and  the  Unending  War,  I.  B.
Tauris, London, 2003.
Singh, Gurharpal, “Crisis of National Unity in India: Punjab, Kashmir, and the Northeast”,
in Paul R. Brass  et. al. (coords.),  Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics, London,
Routledge, 2013, pp. 249-261. 
The  economist,  Kashmir  reviving  the  cause,  available  in
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21704828-turmoil-kashmir-has-reopened-old-wound-
and-hardened-anti-india-sentiment-pakistan-reviving (consulted May 16th 2017).
The  economist  explains,  Why  Kashmir  is  erupting  again,  available  in
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/08/economist-explains-20
(consulted May 16th, 2017).
Uyagoda, Jayadeva, “Ethnic conflict and the civil war in Sri Lanka”, in Paul R. Brass et. al.
(coords.), Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics, London, Routledge, 2013, pp. 291-
302.
Wakhlu, Somnath,  The rich heritage of Jammu and Kashmir, studies in art, architecture,
history and culture of the region, New Delhi, Gyan publishing house, 1998. 
Webb, Matthew J.,  Kashmir’s Right to Secede, a Critical Examination of Contemporary
theories of secession, London, Routledge, 2012.  
Zutshi, Chitralekha, “An ongoing partition: histories, borders, and the politics of vivisection
in Jammu and Kashmir”, in Contemporary South Asia, vol. 23, n°3, 2015, pp. 266-275.
Zutshi,  Chitralekha,  Kashmir’s contested pasts: narratives, sacred geographies,  and the
historical imagination, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2014.
Zutshi, Chitralekha,  Languages of belonging, Islam, regional identity, and the making of
Kashmir, London, Hurst and Company, 2004.  
Zutshi,  Chitralekha,  “Rethinking Kashmir’s history from a  borderlands  perspective”,  in
History Compass, vol.8, n°7, 2010, pp. 594-608. 
Zutshi, Chitralekha, “Translating the Past: Rethinking Rajatarangini, Narratives in Colonial
India”, in The Journal of Asian Studies (Cambridge), vol. 70, n°1, 2011, pp. 5-27.
44
45
